Early Soviet Reactors and EU Accession

4/01

• Over 20 nuclear power reactors of two early Soviet designs continue to operate in Eastern Europe.
  
  
• Since the Chernobyl accident in 1986 there have been various plans to close these down, while more modern designs are improved.
  
  
• Requirements for countries aspiring to join the European Union have renewed the focus on these older reactor types.

As several East European countries queue up to join the European Union they are under pressure to forsake much of their electric power capacity, where this relies upon early Soviet technology. While the main criteria for EU membership are economic, nuclear safety is also on the list. Some of these countries have Soviet-designed nuclear plants, and two early types are the focus of discussion.

Safety concerns of early Soviet plants

Despite extensive modifications in the last 10-15 years, the safety features of these (RBMK and first-generation VVER types) do not conform to Western standards. This does not in itself mean that they are unsafe, simply that their safety features differ from those mandated by western licensing requirements, and the EU requires that they be shut down at an agreed date before the end of their design life. Part of the background to all this relates to the Chernobyl disaster and decisions taken following the reunification of Germany.

After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, Western governments were quick to point the finger at RBMK and first-generation VVER reactors in Eastern Europe in order to emphasise the high levels of safety built into western designs. In the emotive discussion of the late 1980s, western safety standards were taken as the unquestioned yardsticks, while in fact the more profound differences were in safety culture. In the event, no western reactor was stopped and no western construction project aborted by political decision as a result of Chernobyl, and opinion polls supported continued operation of western plants.

After reunification, the new German government in 1989 examined the feasibility of upgrading the six second- and third-generation VVER reactors under construction in East Germany (one had just started up). While it was found that they could in fact be bought up to western safety standards at acceptable cost, they were abandoned because no investor could be found to take on the re-licensing risk in the context of Germany's nuclear bureaucracy and legal processes.

The collapse of socialism in the Comecon countries in 1989 and 1990 paved the way for openness and cooperation between countries that had for decades belonged to antagonistic blocs. The new democracies looked to the West for help in reforming their economies and their administrative structures. The EU set up its assistance programs and individual countries started bilateral programs. The G7 summit in Munich in June 1992 agreed on a multilateral Action Program for improving the safety of all Soviet-designed reactors in Central and Eastern Europe.

The Multilateral Action Program

Two outcomes of this meeting were that assistance or short-term improvements for the two types of reactor would be conditional upon commitments to shut them down "as soon as possible", and that assistance for upgrades of newer plants would require safety studies and analyses of energy policies, energy alternatives and financing. The World Bank and EBRD, its European counterpart, were put in charge of this.

In effect, the G7 governments thus made efficient cooperation impossible because the Action Program interfered with the energy policies of sovereign states and also established complex administrative procedures to bog down any initiative. Above all, it failed to strike a balance between the interests of the G7 countries with those of the reform states.

As a result, eight years after the Munich G7 summit, both sides have reason to be disappointed: none of the reactors considered least safe has been closed, and none of the newer plants has been upgraded in the framework of EU or EBRD credits. However, it is likely that EU funds will be made available for upgrading Bulgaria's Kozloduy 5 and 6, and it is hoped that EBRD and other credits will contribute to the completion and upgrading of Ukraine's Khmelnitski 2 and Rovno 4. But the only upgrading projects that have been or are being implemented so far, i.e. Mochovce 1 & 2 (Slovakia), Paks (Hungary) and Temelin (Czech Rep), were financed privately.

In implementing the Action Program, EU and EBRD consistently promoted early closure of the two condemned reactor types. In exchange for assistance in safety reviews at Kozloduy 1 & 2, they made Bulgaria promise to close all four of its older units by 1998. In return for German export credits for safety upgrades of a newer plant, Mochovce 1 & 2, Slovakia had to promise to close down two older ones (Bohunice 1 & 2) after Mochovce became fully commercial, but in the year 2000 at the latest. In 1995 Ukraine agreed to close the remaining units at Chernobyl by 2000 in exchange for assistance in modernising the Chernobyl-4 shelter and in improving the energy sector of the country, including the completion of two new reactors, Rovno 4 and Khmelnitski 2.

Later on, these countries recognised they were paying too high a price and that in fact the West failed to assist them speedily and efficiently in solving their problems. Therefore, all the Bulgarian and Slovakian units are still operating, though the 2000 deadline for closing Chernobyl in Ukraine was met.

EU Accession

A new round of political manoeuvring was started with the invitation of reform states to join the EU. One of the conditions laid down by the EU in 1997 was that all nuclear plants concerned had to achieve Western safety standards within 7-10 yrs.

Shut-down dates for older units are again on the agenda. Encouraged by the offer of 200 million euros from the EC, it appears that Bulgaria's Kozloduy 1 & 2 will be closed before 2003 and shutdown dates for the next two, Kozloduy 3 & 4, will be fixed in 2002. Slovakia has agreed to close its older units (Bohunice 1 & 2 ) by 2006 and 2008 respectively, despite this year completing a major refurbishing of them, including replacement of the emergency core cooling systems and modernising the control systems. Lithuania agreed to close its first RBMK unit, Ignalina-1, by 2005 and to fix a date for the second in 2004, (probably 2009).

As yet, it is not clear what the requirement of "Western safety standards" will mean for the other nuclear plants operating in reform states. Some plants have undergone or are undergoing major modernisation programs bringing them to Western safety level.

WENRA, the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association, has been put in charge of analysing the safety level of all plants in EU accession candidates. The first report, published in March 1999, met strong criticism regarding some of the findings and it is being reviewed. However, it is understood to have found that the level of safety at Slovakia's condemned units was excellent, and that a similar level is achievable at Bulgaria's if the government decided to do the work and disregard the EU strictures.

More recently nuclear industry represen-tatives from eastern Europe have called for the introduction of transparent and rational EU safety standards rather than punitive closures of reactors which have been substantially upgraded. In particular the Slovak Bohunice 1 & 2 units were cited as prime examples of the high safety standards which such reactors could achieve through upgrading with input from western firms such as Siemens.

Shut-down dates for condemned plants in EU accession countries

The political context

As well as those reactors in contention because of their countries' EU accession plans, there are a number of others of the same two types operating in other east European countries. These include eleven RBMK reactors in Russia, as well as four early VVERs in Russia and one in Armenia. All of these have received substantial attention in upgrading over the last 15 years. Later VVER reactors have also had significant upgrading, but their safety status is less contentious.

The clash of political imperatives and the mundane task of supplying electricity demand is a vexed question almost everywhere in Europe today. Environmental concerns dictate that greenhouse questions must be taken seriously and carbon emissions limited, but a vocal minority also clamours for scaling back nuclear energy production. The particular dilemma in Eastern Europe relates to the definition of safety in nuclear power production, and whether Western standards are the only sensible benchmark.

Sources:

Substantially from paper by W.Breyer, Siemens AG, PIME 2/00,
Siemens Power Journal Dec 99, PPNN Newsbrief # 4/99, ENS NucNet news # 111/00.

Appendix: Soviet-designed Reactors

The Soviet-designed RBMK-type reactor unit of 925 MWe at Chernobyl uses a large mass of graphite to moderate the reaction and water flowing through channels holding the fuel elements to cool it. There is no containment structure on this kind of reactor.

According to the IAEA the safety of many nuclear power plants in the former Eastern Bloc is a continuing concern. The current energy demand in these countries is such that there is little flexibility for closing even those plants which are least safe.

There are currently 62 Soviet-designed nuclear plants in operation in the former Eastern Bloc countries, with others under construction. They include:

Significant assistance has been initiated by the OECD, IAEA and European Commission to bring these reactors up to western safety standards, or at least to effect significant improvements. This involves plant modifications, identification and remedying of safety deficiencies, training of staff and audits of the status of plant components.

The national, bilateral and international safety initiatives being undertaken are concentrating on the first generation of Soviet-built VVER-440/230 pressurised water reactors and the RBMK reactors, which have the most serious deficiencies.

Modifications have already been made to overcome deficiencies in all the RBMK reactors still operating. In these, originally the nuclear chain reaction and power output would increase if cooling water were lost or turned to steam, in contrast to most Western designs. It was this effect which caused the uncontrolled power surge that led to the destruction of Chernobyl-4. All of these reactors have now been modified by changes in the control rods, adding neutron absorbers and consequently increasing the fuel enrichment from 1.8 to 2.4% U-235, making them very much more stable at low power. Automatic shut-down mechanisms now operate faster, and other safety mechanisms have been improved. Automated inspection equipment has also been installed. A repetition of the 1986 Chernobyl accident is now virtually impossible, according to a German nuclear safety agency report.

In 1999 agreement was reached to close down all the VVER-440/230 reactors in Bulgaria and Slovakia, and the RBMK reactors in Lithuania, within ten years as a precondition of EU membership for those countries. The last Chernobyl reactor closed in December 2000.

This leaves the Armenian and four Russian VVER-440/230 reactors and the Russian RBMK reactors as the outstanding safety concerns. However, late in 2000 the Russian government extended the operating lifetimes of its four oldest VVER reactors, its four oldest RBMKs and the four GBWRs in Siberia.